Does category reporting increase donations to charity? A signalling game approach

Edward Cartwright and Amrish Patel

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category reporting will increase giving if the probability a donor is generous is low and/or donor preferences depend a lot on type.

Keywords: Public good; charity; category reporting; signalling. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0924

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