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Marriage payments and bargaining power of women in rural Bangladesh

Nazia Mansoor

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position post marriage as seen by their decision to use the contraceptive pill. Empirical results from multinomial logit provide evidence for this showing that as brideprice, taken as a fraction of total household marriage payment, increases from 0.1 to 0.3 the predicted probability of the mother using the contraceptive pill increases by 8 percentage points.

Keywords: marriage market; marriage payments; female bargaining power; contraceptive use; rural Bangladesh (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 J13 J16 D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-dev
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