Strategic Default in Financial Networks

Nizar Allouch and Maya Jalloul

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: This paper investigates a model of strategic interactions in financial networks, where the decision by one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape default. Agents’ payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced in the seminal contribution of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We first show the existence of a Nash equilibrium of this default game. Next, we develop an algorithm to find all Nash equilibria that relies on the financial network structure. Finally, we explore some policy implications to achieve efficient coordination.

Keywords: systemic risk; default; financial networks; coordination games; central clearing counterparty; financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D53 D85 G21 G28 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cfn, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/repec/1721.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic default in financial networks (2023)
Working Paper: Strategic Default in Financial Networks (2021)
Working Paper: Strategic Default in Financial Networks (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1721

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