Constrained public goods in networks
Nizar Allouch and
Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent
This paper analyses the private provision of public goods where agents interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours’ provisions. We survey the literature and then generalise the public goods in networks model of Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) to allow for constrained provision. In so doing, we show that, using the concept of k-insulated set, any network supports a Nash equilibrium with no intermediate contributors.
Keywords: public goods; Nash equilibrium; k-insulated set; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Constrained public goods in networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1806
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