Myopic Corporate Behaviour and CEO Quality
Andrew Dickerson (),
Christopher J. Ellis and
John Peirson ()
Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent
We develop and test a simple asymmetric information model of CEO quality, in which CEOs know their quality and shareholders may only infer this from observations of corporate profits. CEOs signal their quality to shareholders by manipulating the time path of corporate profits. Though shareholders act optimally, this signalling is inefficient and produces the features of managerial myopia. When there is a pooling equilibrium, this inefficiency may be reduced by the provision to CEOs of Golden Parachutes or long term contracts. When there is a separating equilibrium these measures may not be used to increase efficiency. The assumptions and predictions of the model are validated by comparison with existing evidence and tested against American data on company performance and CEO turnover.
Keywords: Managerial Myopia; Short-Termism; CEO Turnover; Corporate Performance; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G31 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:9611
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7FS.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tracey Girling ().