Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

Micael Castanheira, Marco Giani and Enriqueta Aragones

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipulate voters' priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (a) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (b) choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedback between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in "issue stealing."

JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in: American journal of political science (2015) v.59 n° 1,p.71-90

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral Competition through Issue Selection (2015)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition through Issue Selection (2015)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition through Issue Selection (2012)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition through Issue Selection (2012)
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