EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game

Emanuele Ciriolo

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The introduction of inequity concerns into the Trust Game gives rise to complementary concepts of conditional trustworthiness and unconditional untrustworthiness. When the inequity concern is not accounted for, unconditional untrustworthiness is overestimated. The high proportion of trustees adopting the equal division behavioural norm suggests that an unequal distribution of show-up fees may deter trustors from placing trust, and may eventually reduce the incentive to cooperate for both players. It also follows that increases in income inequality can explain declines in self-reported trust in high-income countries. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Inequality; Reciprocity; Social capital; Trust game; Trustworthiness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in: European journal of political economy (2007) v.23 n° 4,p.1007-1024

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/176651

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/176651

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().

 
Page updated 2022-11-28
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/176651