 Exploit External ConstraintsTito Boeri, Carlo Scarpa, Lidia Tsyganok, Christian Wey, Micael Castanheira, Riccardo Faini, Vincenzo Galasso, Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Stéphane Carcillo, Jonathan Haskel (), Giuseppe Nicoletti and Enrico Perotti ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Abstract: This chapter takes a different angle on policy-making by recognizing that several successful reforms were actually implemented under pressure from external constraints. Although strong governments may prefer to be free to select their reform options, governments facing strong opposition may need to rely on external constraints to increase their bargaining power in the coalition building phase and to limit the opposition of lobby groups. The recipe provided in this chapter is hence to exploit external constraints, such as those imposed by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the Stability Pact, or International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality rules. The chapter concentrates on the reform experience of two transition countries - the Czech Republic and Ukraine - to highlight the role of commitment to reform provided by a truly external constraint; in this case, the European Union. Keywords: Czech Republic; European union; Reforms; Stability pact; Ukraine (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/205655 Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC. |
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