The Exploitation of Economic Leverage in Conflict Protraction:modes and aims. The cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (1992-2008)

Giulia Prelz Oltramonti

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This thesis focuses on a key component of societal relations, namely the creation and exploitation of economic leverage. It explores how, in the context of protracted territorial conflicts, relevant actors craft it and use it. Finally, it examines to what ends economic leverage is exploited, if at all. Generally, economic leverage can translate into a considerable form of power. This thesis scrutinizes how this occurs in more specific contexts post-ceasefire agreement conflict protraction, and what the finalities of the actors concerned are. It does so by focusing on a number of relevant actors, and by treating conflict protraction as the specific context in which economic power is exploited. Two cases are examined, namely those of the South Ossetian and the Abkhaz protracted conflicts. This thesis does not focus on the historical conditions and political events that caused the separatist conflicts in Georgia, but on their consequences and on the periods following the ceasefire agreements (signed respectively in 1992 and 1993), which came to a close with the Russo-Georgian war over South Ossetia in August 2008.

Keywords: Political economy of conflict; Caucasus; Georgia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 356 p.
Date: 2015-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: Degree: Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
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