Incitations perverses, résultats non durables. Le rôle des politiques salariales et fiscales dans la crise financière

Etienne De Callataÿ and Roland Gillet

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The credit crisis of 2007-2009 can be partly explained by the perverse incentives provided by both income and tax policies. Income policies have been designed to address the principal-agent problem but have ended up giving a strong incentive to maximize short term profits. Combined with asymetric pay-off structures, it led to risk-lover behaviors that turned to be detrimental to the organizations and their stakeholders. Tax policies have promoted indebtness through the tax deductibility of interest charges for coroporations and of mortgage for households. Differences in tax treatment have also led to the substitution of more lightly taxed stock options and capital gains to regular remunerations. A side effect of this arbitrage has been to reinforce risk-taking behaviors.

Keywords: Compensation policy; Financial crisis; Fiscal incentives; Tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Published in: Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique (2010) v.49 n° 1,p.59-70

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Journal Article: Incitations perverses, résultats non durables. Le rôle des politiques salariales et fiscales dans la crise financière (2010)
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