On the optimality of public pensions in an economy with life-cyclers and myopes
Frédéric Docquier ()
ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
In this paper, we develop a two-period overlapping generations model with two types of individuals, life-cyclers and myopes. We revisit Feldstein's problem by deriving the optimal level of social security using a social welfare function à la Samuelson (rather than à la Lerner). In opposition to the Lerner solution, our optimal pension benefit exhibits several interesting properties (dynamic efficiency, egalitarism, easy implementation). Then the opportunity to move to a partially funded system is examined. It turns out that a partially funded system ensures the equality of utility within and across generations. The effective use of funding opportunities is less a question of rate of return than a question of equal treatment of individuals. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Published in: Journal of economic behavior & organization (2002) v.47 nÂ° 1,p.121-140
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Journal Article: On the optimality of public pensions in an economy with life-cyclers and myopes (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/229573
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