Bribing votes: a new explanation to the "inequality-redistribution" puzzle in LDC's

Frédéric Docquier and Essaïd Tarbalouti

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The recent empirical literature on redistribution and development emphasizes two main evidences: (i) more redistribution generally induces higher growth rates and (ii) more inequality does not necessarily increase the political demand for redistribution. These stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observed in developed countries. Several theoretical arguments can be advanced to explain these puzzles. In this paper, it is shown that "vote purchases" may be seen as an additional argument to explain puzzle (ii). We formalize this idea and examine the conditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle to redistribution (and thus to growth) in a developing economy.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in: Public choice (2001) v.108 n° 3-4,p.259-272

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Bribing Votes: A New Explanation to the "Inequality-Redistribution" Puzzle in LDCs (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/229581

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/229581

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().