Manipulations électorales, éducation publique et développement économique
Frédéric Docquier () and
ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles
The empirical literature on inequality and economic growth in LDC's reveals that the political demand for redistribution is not increasing with inequality. These stylized facts are at odds with the main stream of the theoretical literature on the political economy of redistribution and growth. Several arguments can be used to explain this puzzle. In this paper, we introduce strategic vote-rigging under the form of vote purchases. We derive the theoretical conditions under which such practices decrease the official redistributive transfers from the rich to the poor. Then, the consequences in terms of growth and development as well as the policy implications are discussed.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in: Revue d'économie du développement (2001) v.101 nÂ° 4,p.47-64
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/229585
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... lb.ac.be:2013/229585
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().