Manipulations électorales, éducation publique et développement économique

Mohamed Bouzahzah, Frédéric Docquier and Essaïd Tarbalouti

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The empirical literature on inequality and economic growth in LDC's reveals that the political demand for redistribution is not increasing with inequality. These stylized facts are at odds with the main stream of the theoretical literature on the political economy of redistribution and growth. Several arguments can be used to explain this puzzle. In this paper, we introduce strategic vote-rigging under the form of vote purchases. We derive the theoretical conditions under which such practices decrease the official redistributive transfers from the rich to the poor. Then, the consequences in terms of growth and development as well as the policy implications are discussed.

Date: 2001
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Published in: Revue d'économie du développement (2001) v.101 n° 4,p.47-64

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/229585

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