 Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport () ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Abstract: In this paper we focus on the possibility of migrants' self-selection through strategic remittances. We argue that migrants of a specific community might be pooled with migrants from other ethnic minorities on the labor market of the foreign host country and that this could reduce the occurrence of strategic remittances. In a simple model with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, facing two possible actions, to migrate or not to migrate, we derive the theoretical conditions under which strategic transfers are still operating when pooling among communities is introduced. We then show through numerical illustrations that the case for strategic transfers is rather weak when using realistic values for the main parameters of the model. Keywords: Culture; Demography; Economics; Emigration and Immigration; Employment; Ethnic Groups; Models, Theoretical; Population; Population Characteristics; Population Dynamics; Research; Social Class; Socioeconomic Factors; Transients and Migrants (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in: Journal of population economics (1998) v.11 n° 4,p.579-588 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/230712 Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC. |
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