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Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism

David Cantala and Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We study school choice markets where the non-strategy-proof Boston mechanism is used to assign students to schools. Inspired by previous field and experimental evidence, we analyze a type of behavior called priority-driven: students have a common ranking over the schools and then give a bonus in their submitted preferences to those schools for which they have high priority. We first prove that under this behavior, there is a unique stable and efficient matching, which is the outcome of the Boston mechanism. Second, we show that the three most prominent mechanisms on school choice (Boston, deferred acceptance, and top trading cycles) coincide when students’ submitted preferences are priority-driven. Finally, we run some computational simulations to show that the assumption of priority-driven preferences can be relaxed by introducing an idiosyncratic preference component, and our qualitative results carry over to a more general model of preferences.

Keywords: Boston algorithm; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Manipulation strategies; School choice; Two-sided many-to-one matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Published in: Review of economic design (2017) v.21 n° 1,p.49-63

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/248240

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