Does the legal enforcement environment constrain earnings management in social enterprises? Evidence from microfinance institutions

Hubert Tchakoute Tchuigoua

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The microfinance sector, with its diverse ownership structures and distinctive capital structure, provides a unique setting to examine cross-country differences in financial reporting practices. However, research on how the legal enforcement environment affects the financial reporting quality of development finance organizations, such as microfinance institutions (MFIs), remains limited. This study hypothesizes that higher financial reporting quality is associated with earnings that are less subject to earnings management. We assess financial reporting quality using abnormal loan loss provisions as a proxy for earnings management. Analyzing a global dataset of MFI financial statements spanning 15 years (2003–2017), we find that financial reporting quality is higher in weaker legal enforcement environments. This suggests that when enforcement is weak, investors rely less on accounting information, leading to less earnings management and higher financial reporting quality. In addition, our results suggest that for-profit MFIs and those less dependent on subsidies engage in less upward earnings management in weak enforcement environments.

Date: 2026-09-01
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Published in: The British accounting review (2026) v.58 n° 1

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