Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries

Antonio Estache, A. Goicoechea and Lourdes Trujillo ()

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. Finally, our results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utilities services. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Corruption; Privatization; Regulation; Utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in: Utilities policy (2008),p.1-12

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries (2009)
Working Paper: Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries (2007)
Working Paper: Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/43908

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... ulb.ac.be:2013/43908

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().