Do Regulation and Ownership Drive the Efficiency of Electricity Distribution? Evidence from Latin America

Antonio Estache and Martín Rossi

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We analyze the impact of alternative regulatory regimes on the labor productivity of electricity distribution firms in Latin America. We find that (i) incentive-based regimes lead to higher labor productivity than rate-of-return regulation, and (ii) privatized firms operating under rate of return have, at most, similar labor productivity as public firms. © 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

Date: 2004
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in: Economics letters (2004) v.86 n° 2,p.253-257

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Journal Article: Do regulation and ownership drive the efficiency of electricity distribution? Evidence from Latin America (2005)
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