Subventions et politique de concurrence

Patrick Legros

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Transfers to firms and regions are made both at the level of member states (state aids) and at the level of the European Commission (Structural Funds). State aids can take different forms: direct (transfers, tax exemptions) or indirect (e.g. the definition of the reserved area in network industries). There are significant cross-country differences both in the magnitude and the type of instruments used for state aids. The European Commission acts as a de-facto regulator by using competition law to approve state aids. We analyze the rationale of this two step process by pointing out the benefits of decentralizing redistributive decisions to the member states and the costs linked to reduced coordination (the use of structural funds, viewed as a complement to state aids, reduces some of these costs). We then point out that in a second best world objectives of redistribution are not incompatible with competition but that their relationship is less straightforward than with perfect markets; this has consequences for the rationale of having block exemptions, and for the effects of structural funds.

Keywords: Competition law; Redistribution; Second best; State aids; Structural funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in: Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique (2004) v.43,p.11-24

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/7058/1/pl-0020.pdf pl-0020 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Subventions et politique de concurrence (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/7058

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... .ulb.ac.be:2013/7058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().