Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies
Mathias Dewatripont () and
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We study a credit model where, because of adverse selection, unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed. Indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low-quality if sunk costs have already been incurred. We show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects, thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially. Thus, decentralization provides financial discipline. Nevertheless, we argue that it puts too high a premium on short-term returns. The model seems pertinent to two issues: Soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies, and differences between Anglo-Saxon and German-Japanese” financing. © 1995 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (1995) v.62,p.541-555
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Working Paper: Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies (2004)
Journal Article: Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies (1995)
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