Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty

Frederic Koessler

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: In persuasion games, it is well known that a perfectly revealing equilibrium may fail to exist when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party\'s payoff-relevant information. However, by explicitly integrating higher order uncertainty into the information structure, this paper shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space. On the contrary, when payoff-irrelevant disclosures are impossible, a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist as long as there is a strictly positive probability that the decision maker does not know whether the interested party is informed or not. In this case, a partially revealing equilibrium and associated inferences are characterized.

Keywords: Strategic information revelation; Persuasion games; Higher order uncertainty; Provability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2001-14

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