Monetary accommodation and unemployment: Why central bank transparency matters

Eleftherios Spyromitros and Blandine Zimmer ()

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: Recent contributions have shown that in the presence of strategic interactions be- tween non atomistic unions and the central bank, an accommodating monetary policy rule may increase equilibrium unemployment. This note demonstrates that this result can be reversed considering the case where the central bank is not fully transparent concerning its reaction to wage decisions.

Keywords: Monetary regime; Wage setting; Central bank transparency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E5 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary accommodation and unemployment: Why central bank transparency matters (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-27

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