Bankruptcy Law: a Mechanism of Governance for Financially Distressed Firms

Régis Blazy, Bertrand Chopard and Agnès Fimayer

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: This paper explores the various governance models for financially distressed firms. We offer a new typology of major bankruptcy models and provide a connection between this bankruptcy law puzzle and the variables depicting the governance of healthy firms in order to shed light on two topics: (1) the factors that the lawyer should consider before removing its national bankruptcy law, and (2) the risks associated with each bankruptcy model according to the economic literature on bankruptcy law. Our final aim is to test whether the various bankruptcy models detailed in the paper perform in separate economic and legal environments.

Keywords: Bankruptcy; Governance; Law and Economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Journal Article: Bankruptcy law: a mechanism of governance for financially distressed firms (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-33

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