Voluntary participation and cooperation in a collective-good game
Kene Boun My () and
Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg
We study the effect of voluntary participation in the context of a collective-good experiment. We investigate whether the freedom to participate in the game or not increases contribution levels and enhances their evolution. The analysis of two voluntary participation treatments supports a positive effect of an attractive exit option on both contribution levels and their sustainability. We conclude that the voluntary contribution mechanism can provide sustainable cooperation levels and that the usually observed decay of average contribution levels can be counteracted by voluntary participation in the game..
Keywords: Collective Goods; Cooperation; Voluntary participation; Laboratory experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Voluntary participation and cooperation in a collective-good game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-01
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