Bargaining structures, rent-seeking effect and endogenous growth

Isabelle Terraz

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: Market power of workers on wages is bound to affect economic performances. This paper focuses on this issue and analyse the influence of bargaining structures on growth and labor market functioning. To achieve this, we construct an endogenous growth model where growth appears as the result of a learning-by-doing process whereas imperfect information in the labor market implies matching frictions in the hiring process. If investment occurs before wage bargaining, the growth process can be durably altered. In this case, a higher bargaining power of worker does not give a clear-cut effect on growth.

Keywords: Bargaining structures; Equilibrium Unemployment; Endogenous growth; Learning-by-doing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J50 J64 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-fdg, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2009/2009-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).