The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law

Jenny Helstroffer and Marie Obidzinski

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: The newly introduced codecision procedure in asylum lawmaking at the EU level is analyzed through the lens of bargaining theory. We find a substantial institutional status quo bias, which can contribute to explain the current delays in asylum lawmaking. When a policy is agreed on, codecision increases the European Parliament’s influence, although the bargaining outcome is biased towards the Council of Ministers. It can nonetheless improve asylum seekers’ welfare. The Commission detains an agenda setting power.

Keywords: Asylum policy; Public choice; Codecision; EU institutions; Human rights. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 F22 H53 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2011/2011-16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-16

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).