Effects of gain-loss frames on social preferences
Kene Boun My (),
Nicolas Lampach () and
Mathieu Lefebvre ()
Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg
The paper provides new experimental evidence on the difference between inequality aversion in the gain and in the loss domain. Incorporating loss aversion in the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and relying on a modified dictator game as proposed by Blanco et al. (2011), we demonstrate that the parameter of inequality aversion is lower when the game is framed with losses than with gains. Individuals would be less inequality averse for losses than for gains. The results also manifest that women are more inequality averse than men.
Keywords: social preferences; inequality aversion; modified dictator game; loss aversion; laboratory experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2016-21
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