Risk, Ambiguity and Efficient Liability Rules: An experiment
Nicolas Lampach (),
Kene Boun My () and
Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg
We conduct experiments to study the incentive effects of strict liability by comparing both regimes, unlimited and limited liability in the domain of risk and ambiguity. We assume that the firm’s activities cause a risk of technological disaster and can invest in prevention to reduce the likelihood of accident. We assess Lampach and Spaeter’s theoretical predictions. We find on average high levels of investment under limited liability in the domain of risk, consistent with the theory, but lower level of investment in prevention in the domain of ambiguity. We do not find that subjects’ degree of optimism affect the decision choice albeit we demonstrate strong evidence in favor of inequity aversion, fairness and risk preferences.
Keywords: Strict liability; Technological disaster; Experiment; Risk; Ambiguity; Optimism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2016-30
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