Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment

Cécile Bazart, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods.

Keywords: Experiment; Persuasion; Commitment; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-war
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment (2019)
Working Paper: Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-05

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