Wheels and cycles: (sub)optimality and volatility of corrupted economies
David Desmarchelier and
Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg
We consider a simple economy where production depends on labor supply and social capital. Networking increases the social capital ("greases the wheel") but also the corruption level ("sands the wheel"). Corruption is a negative productive externality. We compare the market economy, where the negative externality is not taken in account by individuals, with a centralized economy, where the planner internalizes the negative effect. We highlight the possible existence of cycles in the market economy and optimal cycles in the planned one. We compare the centralized and the decentralized solutions in the short and in the long run.
Keywords: Corruption; optimal cycles; Ramsey model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 E32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gro and nep-mac
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Journal Article: Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies (2022)
Working Paper: Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies (2022)
Working Paper: Wheels an cycles: (sub)optimality and volatility of corrupted economies (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-25
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