Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution
Marc Willinger () and
Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg
We show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game.
Keywords: experimental economics; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:9901
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