Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution

Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: We show that experimental subjects tend to contribute more to the public good if they perceive the actions of the others as a source of positive externality rather than a source of negative externality. In our experiment partial contribution to the public good is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the repeated game.

Keywords: experimental economics; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (89)

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Journal Article: Framing and cooperation in public good games: an experiment with an interior solution (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:9901

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