Right-Financing Security Sector Reform

Gordon Peake and Peter Middlebrook

Working Papers from Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Abstract: Security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict environments encompasses a broad range of efforts to improve capacity, governance, performance, and sustainability. The fiscal implications of SSR decisions often are neglected, however. The negative consequences of this neglect include unsustainable reforms, the squeezing out of other vital sectors, and ultimately under-provision of security itself. This paper argues for a “right-financing” approach to SSR that strikes an appropriate balance between current needs and the goal of building a fiscally sustainable security sector. The paper offers four policy proposals: first, build fiscal dimensions of the security sector into peace agreements, post-conflict needs assessments, development strategies, and expenditure planning; second, align short-run policies with long-term budgetary realities; third, move to a “service-delivery” model based on provision of law-and-order and justice services to the citizens; and finally, strengthen international capacities to support these right-financing policies.

Keywords: Security sector reform; fiscal sustainability; service delivery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H50 H56 O19 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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