Agency Behavior in a Nonprofit Setting: Effects of the 1984 Supreme Court NCAA Decision

Kathleen A. Carroll () and Brad Humphreys

No 03-106, UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics

Abstract: The NCAA is commonly viewed as a cartel. We model the cartel relationship between the member teams and the NCAA central organization as a principal-agent relationship. Our model predicts imperfect agency behavior on the part of the NCAA with corresponding overregulation relative to the level preferred by the member teams. We empirically test the model by examining the impact of the 1984 Supreme Court decision that reassigned the telecast rights for intercollegiate football from the NCAA to the individual member teams. Our empirical estimates of telecasts, attendance, and competitive balance support the prediction of imperfect agency behavior by the NCAA.

Keywords: NCAA; Intercollegiate Football; Broadcast Regulation; Antitrust Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L31 L44 L82 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_03_106.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umb:econwp:03106

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics UMBC Department of Economics 1000 Hilltop Circle Baltimore MD 21250, USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christelle Viauroux ().