Stable Schedule Matchings
Vilmos Komornik (),
Zsolt Komornik () and
Additional contact information
Vilmos Komornik: Université de Strasbourg, http://www-irma.u-strasbg.fr/~komornik/
Zsolt Komornik: Université de Strasbourg
No 10-120, UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics
In order to treat a natural schedule matching problem related with worker-firm matchings, we generalize some theorems of Baiou--Balinski and Alkan--Gale by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner.
Keywords: Stable matching, Schedule matching, Two-sided market; Revealed preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2010-05-12, Revised 2011-07-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umb:econwp:10120
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics UMBC Department of Economics 1000 Hilltop Circle Baltimore MD 21250, USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christelle Viauroux ().