Evaluating Central Regulatory Institutions with an Application to the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

Robert Farrow

No 12-01, UMBC Economics Department Working Papers from UMBC Department of Economics

Abstract: Alternative governmental models and evaluation designs are used to analyze central regulatory institutions. Such institutions are increasingly used world wide to coordinate or advise decision making on regulatory actions that extend across multiple agencies. Bureaucratic, economic, and political framings are used to inform data collection and analysis. These framings and designs are illustrated using analyses of the process and outcome of regulatory review at the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Several data sets are analyzed, including a quantile regression of data from Morrall (2003).

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2012-01
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