Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining

Saku Aura

No 217, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: This paper studies married couples dynamic investment and consumption choices under the assumption that the couple cannot commit across time to not to renegotiate their decisions. The inefficiencies that can arise are characterized. Efficiency properties of different divorce asset division regimes are examined. A stylized common law regime is shown to lead to a fully efficiency in a simple model while it is shown that under community property regime the couple is unlikely to attain full efficiency. The effect of inability to commit across time on the savings level is examined under a tractable special case of the model.

JEL-codes: D10 D91 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pgs.
Date: 2002-09-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining (2003)
Working Paper: Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0217

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