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Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform

Peter Mueser, Lael Keiser () and Seung-Whan Choi
Additional contact information
Lael Keiser: Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-Columbia, https://politicalscience.missouri.edu/people/keiser

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carolyn Heinrich

No 307, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of the race of individual clients and of the local racial context on the implementation of sanctions for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in a Midwestern state. We find that although nonwhites are sanctioned at lower rates than whites overall, nonwhites are sanctioned more compared to whites in each local area. This paradox occurs because nonwhites tend to live in areas with lower sanction rates. Consistent with the literature on race and policy, we find that sanction rates increase as the nonwhite population increases until a threshold is reached where nonwhites gain political power.

JEL-codes: I38 L32 J78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pgs.
Date: 2003-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-ure
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Published in American Journal of Political Science, (vol. 48, no. 2, April 2004) pp. 314-327

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https://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2003/wp0307-mueser.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0307

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