Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games

Jeffrey Milyo, Jennifer Mellor () and Lisa Anderson

No 417, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: We test the conventional wisdom that political ideology is associated with generosity or compassion by comparing the behavior of experimental subjects in public goods or trust games. We find that self-described liberals and those identifying more closely with the Democrat party are just as likely to free-ride as conservatives or Republican-leaners; likewise, political ideology is unrelated to observed trusting behavior or trustworthiness in a bilateral trust game.

Keywords: Political Party; Free Rider (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pgs.
Date: 2004-12-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as chapter in Advances in Applied Microeconomics: Experimental and Behavioral Economics. John Morgan, Editor. (JAI Press: Stamford, Connecticut)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games (2004)
Working Paper: Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0417

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