Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States

Jeffrey Milyo and David M. Primo

No 513, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: The decline of political efficacy and trust in the United States is often linked to the rise of money in politics. Both the courts and reform advocates justify restrictions on campaign donations and spending as necessary for the improvement of links between the government and the governed. We conduct the first test of whether campaign finance laws actually influence how citizens view their government by exploiting the variation in campaign finance regulations both across and within states during the last half of the 20th century. Our analysis reveals no large positive effects of campaign finance laws on political efficacy. Public disclosure laws and limits on contributions from organizations are in some cases associated with modest increases in efficacy, but public financing is associated with a similarly modest decrease in efficacy.

Keywords: Campaign finance; trust; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H8 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pgs.
Date: 2005-08-25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Election Law Journal 2006

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0513

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