Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?

Ronald Harstad

No 711, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: Jeremy I. Bulow and Paul D. Klemperer (AER, 1996) argue that the usual concerns of auction design miss the big picture, and show that a simple English auction without a reserve price and N + 1 bidders attains expected revenue in excess of any auction with N bidders. The issue of how this additional bidder might be attracted is not treated in their model. In fact, that an auction can convince another bidder it is worth his while to compete carries a critical message about expected revenue. In those many markets where potential bidders decide whether to compete in an auction based on the expected probability of bidding, Bulow and Klemperer's conclusion is shown here to be overturned. I explore the symmetric equilibrium of a model where potential bidders first decide whether to participate in an auction, and then participants select bidding strategies. Expected revenue is increased by some degree of bidder discouragement, in that it is never optimal to have all N potential bidders participate with probability one, even for very small N

Keywords: affiliated-values auctions; auction revenue; number of bidders; increased competition; endegenous bidder participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pgs.
Date: 2007-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0711

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