Information Variability Impacts in Auctions

Ronald Harstad, Michael Rothkopf and Justin Jia

No 908, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: A wide variety of auction models exhibit close relationships between the winner's expected profit and the expected difference between the highest and second-highest order statistics of bidders' information, and between expected revenue and the second-highest order statistic of bidders' expected asset values. We use stochastic orderings to see when greater environmental variability of bidders' information enhances expected profit and expected revenue.

Keywords: affiliated-values auctions; auction revenue; number of bidders; increased competition; endegenous bidder participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pgs.
Date: 2009-06-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Variability Impacts in Auctions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:0908

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