Capital Controls or Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective
Christopher Otrok (),
Alessandro Rebucci () and
Eric Young ()
No 1209, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri
In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged in which old-fashioned policies such as capital controls and other government distortions have become part of the standard policy toolkit (the so-called macro-prudential policies). On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical literature contends that capital controls are welfare enhancing and can be justified rigorously because of second-best considerations. Within the same theoretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature, we show that a credible commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always welfare- dominates prudential capital controls as it can achieve the first best unconstrained allocation. In this benchmark economy, prudential capital controls are optimal only when the set of policy tools is restricted so that they are the only policy instrument available.
Keywords: Capital Controls; Exchange Rate Policy; Financial Frictions; Financial Crises; Financial Stability; Optimal Taxation; Prudential Policies; Planning Problem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 F37 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Capital Controls or Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective (2012)
Working Paper: Capital controls or exchange rate policy? A pecuniary externality perspective (2012)
Working Paper: Capital controls or exchange rate policy? a pecuniary externality perspective (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:1209
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valerie Kulp ().