Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition: Towards More Policy Relevant Research

Jeffrey Milyo

No 1311, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: There is a long-standing scholarly literature on the electoral effects of campaign spending; nevertheless, the academic research offers only limited guidance for policy makers interested in campaign finance reform. In part, this is because existing studies have focused narrowly on some vexing statistical issues, while ignoring many others. But it is also because political scientists have not devoted enough effort conducting evaluation studies of how regulatory policies impact the intermediate goal of competition, let alone the ultimate policy goals of reduced corruption, increased citizen participation and improved public policy. Consequently, there is a great need for updated and improved analyses of the treatment effect of campaign spending on political competition in a variety of electoral contexts, but an even greater need for the application of modern evaluation methods to the more basic question of whether campaign finance reforms "work" as advertised.

Keywords: campaign spending; political competition; campaign finance reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pgs.
Date: 2013-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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