The Public's Right To Know Versus Compelled Speech: What Does Social Science Research Tell Us About The Benefits And Costs Of Campaign Finance Disclosure In Non-Candidate Elections?

Jeffrey Milyo and Dick Carpenter

No 1312, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Missouri

Abstract: We review the arguments and evidence for compelled financial disclosure by groups engaged in grassroots issue advocacy or active in ballot measures elections. There is no anti-corruption rationale for disclosure requirements, since these activities do not directly affect candidates for elective office. That leaves only an informational rationale for disclosure in non-candidate contexts. However, there is little evidence that the public utilizes information disclosed by such regulations, or even that disclosure adds to the stock of more readily available and salient information. In contrast, a growing literature documents that there are non-trivial costs of compliance to these regulations, especially for newer or informal citizen coalitions. We conclude with a discussion of the lessons from the social science literature for practical reforms.

Keywords: public corruption; campaign finance; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pgs.
Date: 2013-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umc:wpaper:1312

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