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Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements? Asking decision-makers in firm

Kathryn Hendley () and Peter Murrell
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Kathryn Hendley: University of Wisconsin-Madison

Electronic Working Papers from University of Maryland, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper proposes a methodology to obtain evidence on the relative importance of different mechanisms for supporting agreements. A survey question posed to company directors summarizes key aspects of mechanisms and asks for judgments on use. In contrast to existing approaches, the data covers the full complement of mechanisms and much economic activity, offering aggregate numerical judgments. The methodology is applied in Romania. Popular hypotheses are examined. Bilateralism is numerically dominant; the legal system is used extensively; third-party mechanisms are less important. These three mechanisms are non-complementary.

Keywords: Law; transactions; private ordering; law; networks; transition; Romania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 P2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2003-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umd:umdeco:03-002

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Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742

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