Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights
Peter Murrell
Electronic Working Papers from University of Maryland, Department of Economics
Abstract:
A fundamental question in economic development is how societies first acquire a successful set of institutions. To examine this question, the paper focuses on a paradigmatic example, England in the years surrounding the Glorious Revolution of 1688. North and Weingast (1989) view the constitutional changes following 1688 as an explicit attempt to design a new polity, having the effect of radically altering the functioning of the English political and economic system. The rise of England as a world economic power followed. In contrast, Hayek (1960) views the late 17th century changes as simply summarizing what was already in existence, a product of experience accumulated through trial and error and selective survival of productive institutions, ideas, and habits. This paper argues that the English experience of institutional development cannot be described as creation by design. The rise of England fits Hayek's evolutionary perspective. This conclusion rests on three composite pieces of evidence. First, a search for structural breaks in myriad data sets reveals that socioeconomic change was under way well before 1688. Second, an examination of the historical context and institutional content of each clause of the critical laws shows either that the clauses were already a part of effective law by 1688 or that they did not survive as viable constitutional measures. Third, an analysis of institutional and administrative innovations shows that many key developments affecting government finance were a product of the era before 1688.
Keywords: Institutions; institutional development; constitutions; Glorious Revolution; design; evolution; Hayek; Bill of Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 H1 K1 N0 N13 N43 O1 O52 P5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 87 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-evo, nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Journal Article: Design and evolution in institutional development: The insignificance of the English Bill of Rights (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:umd:umdeco:09-001
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Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Tydings Hall, College Park, MD 20742
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