Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle

Michele Lombardi, Kaname Miyagishima and Roberto Veneziani

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. An axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, named the Weak Harm Principle, is studied, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill s essay On Liberty. It is shown that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for social welfare judgements, in both the finite and the infinite context. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, a surprisingly strong and general relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition. JEL Categories:

Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle (2016)
Working Paper: Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle (2013)
Working Paper: Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle (2009)
Working Paper: Liberal Egalitarianism and the Harm Principle (2009)
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