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Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods

Biung-Ghi Ju () and Juan Moreno-Ternero

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: Robert Nozick allegedly introduced his liberal theory of private ownership as an objection to theories of end-state justice. Nevertheless, we show that, in a stylized framework for the allocation of goods in joint ventures, both approaches can be seen as complementary. More precisely, in such a context, self-ownership (the basis for Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice) followed by voluntary transfer (Nozick’s principle of just transfer) can lead to end-state fairness (as well as Pareto efficiency). Furthermore, under a certain solidarity condition, the only way to achieve end-state fairness, following Nozick’s procedure, is to endorse an egalitarian rule for the initial assignment of rights.

Keywords: fairness; claims; no-envy; individual rationality; egalitarianism; efficiency; Walrasian exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: ENTITLEMENT THEORY OF JUSTICE AND END-STATE FAIRNESS IN THE ALLOCATION OF GOODS (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods (2018)
Working Paper: Entitlement theory of justice and end-state fairness in the allocation of goods (2017) Downloads
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