Securing Basic Well-being for All

Reiko Gotoh () and Naoki Yoshihara ()
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Reiko Gotoh: Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers from University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of a social choice rule to implement a social policy for securing basic well-being for all. The paper introduces a new scheme of social choice, called a social relation function (SRF), which associates a reflexive and transitive binary relation over a set of social policies to each profile of individual well-being appraisals and each profile of group evaluations. As part of the domains of SRFs, the available class of group evaluations is constrained by three conditions. Furthermore, the non-negative response (NR) and the weak Pareto condition (WP) are introduced. NR demands giving priority to group evaluation, while treating the groups as formally equal relative to each other. WP requires treating impartially the well-being appraisals of all individuals. In conclusion, this paper shows that under some reasonable assumptions, there exists an SRF that satisfies NR and WP.

Keywords: basic well-being; individual well-being appraisals; social rela- tion functions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Securing basic well-being for all (2018)
Working Paper: Securing Basic Well-being for All (2017)
Working Paper: Securing basic well-being for all (2015)
Working Paper: Securing Basic Well-being for All (2014)
Working Paper: Securing Basic Well-being for All (2013)
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