The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

Pedro Mendi

No 05/03, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: I analyze a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms, where I observe firm and technology characteristics, as well as the type of scheduled payments, whether fixed and/or variable. I find first that technology type influences the chances of the parties reaching an agreement, and second, that the explanations for observed payments based on moral hazard or risk aversion alone are not satisfactory. I argue that all these theories fail to take into account the fact that the contractual relationship is extended along time and that the parties will choose the kind of payments that better estimate the value of the relationship.

JEL-codes: F23 L14 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2003-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2005, 14(2): pp. 403-429

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1132243396_wp0503.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1132243396_wp0503.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1132243396_wp0503.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp0503

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().